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A considerable body of research evidence has accumulated in the past two
decades dealing with the question of variations in state-level public expenditures in
the United States (Bahl & Saunders, 1965; Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Dawson &
Gray, 1971; Dye, 1966; Fabricant, 1952; Fisher, 1964; Gold, 1969; Sachs & Harris,
1964; Sharkansky, 1967). Although a number of major disagreements are still
present, there are also several principal themes widely agreed upon in the findings
of these various studies. For example, there is the methodological issue of whether
the states and localities should be considered jointly or dealt with separately. See
the exchange between Morss and Sharkansky in 1966 issues of the Journal of
Politics, for example, Also, there is an on-going debate among political scientist over
the nature of political system predictors. See Dawson & Robinson (1963) and Dye
(1966) as well as Fenton & Chamberlayne (1969) and Hofferbert (1972) for different
approaches to this issue. It appears, for example, that there I widespread
agreement among the investigators that interstate variance in total aggregate state
government expenditures corresponds with tax efforts of the various state entities,
so that it can be said that some measure of equilibrium between taxing and
spending aspects of state activity exists.
Further, the relationship is a positive one so that those states that tax a
relatively higher proportion of personal and corporate income for public purposes
are also likely to be states with a relatively more extensive public sector, at least as
measured by expenditures. Several investigators have also found expenditure levels
to be strongly correlated with a variety of measures of demographic, social and
economic conditions in the states whose public sectors were under study. A Overall
state expenditures have been found to vary with such variables as population
density, population size, location, educational attainment, per capita income and
other measure of income distribution among the population. Overall, a rather
extensive list of mid-range generalizations regarding the association between state
expenditures and other predictor variables can be developed based on contemporary
research.
Having offered the outlines of coherent explanations for overall expenditure
patterns in the states, quantitative investigators, as is their wont, have increasingly
moved in other directions. Most interestingly from our perspective, has been
movement in the direction of applying these insights to individual functional and
programmatic areas within the sum of state expenditures. In general, evidence
there seems to be compatible with the overall findings and to indicate that most
functional areas correspond – to greater or lesser degrees – to the general patterns.
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There has, however, been one outstanding and consistent exception to this
general development. Variations among the states in public welfare expenditures
have consistently been dissimilar enough, and the resulting correlation coefficients
between welfare expenditures and this set of recognized independent variables low
enough, to support the conclusion that public welfare expenditures are the single
most outstanding exception with regard to the explanation of state governmental
expenditures today. In fact, as things presently stand we can say virtually nothing
affirmative about factors influencing the range of welfare expenditures found
among the states despite the fact that there have been nearly a dozen recent studies
in which such public welfare expenditures were one of the principal dependent
variables under investigation.
In light of this circumstance, the purpose of this paper is three-fold:
1. To explore some of the reasons that public welfare is so unlike other public
expenditures
2. To outline the principal findings of other studies bearing on this question (for
what they did not find as well as what they did).
3. To report the results of a number of tests of plausible hypotheses for
explaining major portions of the observed variations in the expenditure
patterns.
For reasons noted below, the analysis will be focused on a single categorical
assistance program, Old Age Assistance (OAA) which has been of consistent interest
to researchers from its inception in 1935 to its replacement by the federal
Supplemental Security Income program in 1974. (Because this research was already
underway when Congress enacted the SSI program, the decision was made to
continue, even though the results are now primarily of historical interest.)

Review of Relevant Research
The first major study of variations in state and local government expenditures
was published by Solomon Fabricant (1952). Multiple regression analysis with a set
of three independent variables as predictors – per capita personal income, the
percentage of urban population in a state, and population density of a state – were
used in a prediction equations that accounted for major proportions of the variations
in aggregate state and local expenditures. Fabricant found that these three
predictors accounted for roughly 70 percent of the total variance in combined state
and local expenditures in 1952.
Numerous things are noteworthy about this study. In addition to being the first
such study and a consequent benchmark for later studies, it was historical in
nature, dealing with the period from 1900 to 1950. The results were reported in a
fairly limited, circumscribed manner and no universal conclusions regarding the
nature of the states and localities or their social, economic and political systems
were reached. The general meaning attached to these data was that the total output
of goods and services produced by the states and localities varied as a function of
these three variables.
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One of the concerns that is readily apparent is that the implications of these
three variables have changed drastically in the two decades since the end of
Fabricant’s study period. The total farm population has been in decline at least
since the 1920s. This, together with the development of mass communications
(particularly television) and the post-war spread of suburban sprawl, have
drastically changed the meaning of the distinction Fabricant drew about the role of
the percentage of urban population as a predictor. In addition, in the post-war
period per capita personal income has increased several times over since 1945 in a
trend John Kenneth Galbraith termed the rise of the affluent society (Galbraith,
1958) Note: Galbraith was a noted public intellectual and Kennedy-era liberal. In
2007, a conservative analyst, Brink Lindsey. looked at the period after Galbraith’s
study was published and reached similar conclusions regarding what he termed the
age of abundance.(Lindsey, 2007; Thurow & Lucas, 1974) Finally, urban sprawl
appears to have profoundly altered the nature of population density, which is a
ratio of population to land area. It is not at all surprising therefore that recent
studies have found that these three variables are less important than Fabricant
found in explaining existing variations in state and local expenditures. Even so,
many of the measures employed more recently are clearly derivatives of Fabricant
original set of variables.
Glenn Fisher (1961) found that the three variables explained only about fifteen
percent of the variance in state and local public welfare expenditures in 1957,
although they accounted for fifty three percent of the variance in general spending.
Bahl and Saunders (1965) found these same variables largely unrelated to changes
in general expenditures between 1957 and 1960, accounting for only eighteen
percent of the observed variance there.
In 1964, Fisher brought the proportion of explained variance (R2) to .654 with a
multiple regression equation of seven variables. The new variables that he deployed
in this study were: percentage of families with less than $2,000 income; yield of the
representative tax system; population increases; levels of two party competition;
and educational attainment of the adult population (over age 25). Fisher tested this
equation against variations in state and local educational, highway, health, fire and
sanitation expenditures as well as public welfare expenditures. While the specific
relationships in all other cases conformed to the general finding, Fisher found only
negligible correspondence between the predictor variables and public welfare
expenditures (R2 = .194).
For our purposes in explaining public welfare expenditures, this set of variables
can be seen to have two implications: First, they account for roughly two-thirds of
the variance in public state expenditures in 1960; and secondly, like other prior
studies none of these factors – not even the proportion of low income people in the
total population – explained to any important degree variations in state public
welfare expenditures. Even so, the three categories into which Fisher divided these
variables – economic, demographic and political – correspond with important
distinctions that emerged in this literature later.
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The variables that Fisher employed in this study are in large measure
compatible with those used by Thomas Dye in his theoretical synthesis of research
on comparative public expenditures in the United States with other policy outcome
measures of state governmental activity (Dye, 1966). Dye’s research design involved
a comparison of a set of four economic development variables – industrial
production, urban population, personal income and educational attainment – with a
set of six political system measures as predictors of state policy outcomes of nearly
100 expenditure and program categories. In general, Dye concluded through the use
of partial correlation procedures that the apparent effects of political system
measures were in fact due to the intervening influence of the economic development
of the economic development variables.
Once again, public welfare expenditures were found to be a major exception to
Dye’s conclusion. While some of the variance explained by his four economic
development variables ranged upwards to .75 and beyond, the record in the area of
public assistance is far less encouraging. The four economic development variables
combined were found to account for only a very small percentage of the variance in
Old Age Assistance expenditures, and the greater portion of this is probably due to
the influence of a single variable (the correlation with urban population was .19).
Dye’s study was based in part on the public expenditure literature already cited.
The principal hypothesis, however, was drawn from the previously mentioned study
published three years earlier by Dawson and Robinson (1963) which cast doubt on
the general applicability of the orthodox political science explanation for welfare
payment and expenditure levels. Previous to that welfare levels in the states were
generally assumed to be a function of conflict between economic haves and have
nots through the party system. Thus, high levels of individual payments to
recipients were closely associated with high levels of interparty competition.
Dawson and Robinson demonstrated that this hypothesized relationship was
statistically spurious doe to the intervening influence of what they termed economic
development variables (and measured by per capital income data for the states).
The welfare payment and expenditure data that they used was for Old Age
Assistance programs, thus injection the topic of this paper into the core of the issue.
Unfortunately, because of the Dye results noted, it does not follow that economic
development is a major independent predictor of variation in assistance
expenditures; only that it accounts for the spurious influence of interparty
competition.
Other studies reported by Sharkansky (1967), Dawson and Gray (1971) and Gold
(11969) also bear tangentially on aspects of the variation in welfare expenditures.
In general, however, it is clear that public welfare in the states continues to be the
single least understood category from the vantage point of public finance. The
difficulty may be due, in part, to the aggregate nature of the variable: Public
welfare expenditures do not represent a single uniform coherent program measure
but are instead a summary measure of the different expenditure patterns of four
distinct federal-state categorical aid programs – Aid to the Aged (OAA), Blind (AB),
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Disabled (AD) and Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as well as the
general assistance provided in some, but not all, states. Table 1 below shows the
large differences in total national expenditure levels for these four programs over
the past four decades.
Table 1. Differences in Expenditure levels of Four Public Assistance Programs
(in Hundreds of Million Dollars)
Categorical Aid
Program

1940

1950

1960

1970

Old Age
Assistance

474

1511

2015

2085

AFDC

133

560

1131

4963

22

55

100

111

**

**

303

1064

Aid to Blind
Aid to Disabled

Data from United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National
Center for Social Statistics Report F-5 (FY36-70) and covers program and
administrative expenses combined.
**The Aid for the Disabled program was not established until 1950.

The table indicates relatively large increases in Old Age Assistance expenditures
from 1940 to 1950 and 1950 to 1960, but much more modest increases between 1960
and 1970. This contrast sharply with the AFDC program, for which expenditures
more than quadrupled during that latter decade. These two programs represent the
extremes of variation among the four assistance programs. It seems doubtful that
generalizations regarding public welfare expenditures patterns could be extended
sufficiently to cover both of these extremes.
In what follows, I will deal with only one of these extremes: the Old Age
Assistance program. My reasons for choosing this rather than the seemingly more
dramatic case of AFCD are several. Most importantly is the dramatic growth of the
aged population and the relatively high levels of poverty among older people. In
addition, there is also the continuity provided by the prior history of studies of OAA
expenditures noted above. One has, from the onset, at least some indication of
which variables not to study, while in the case of AFDC, a considerably smaller
number of variables have been considered and rejected.

Variations in OAA Expenditures
Our first undertaking in this regard must be to gain some understanding of the
nature of the variations in Old Age Assistance expenditures in the states. Table 2
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shows the range of variations of 1970 aggregate OAA expenditures and
expenditures controlled for population size, as well as the rank order of the states
on such expenditures and the coefficient of variation. The variation among OAA
expenditures per capita (67.7) is considerably larger than that reported by Fisher
for general state expenditures in 1965 (20.5) as well as for public welfare (38.4).
This greater variance may account in part for some of the deviance demonstrated by
public assistance expenditures in that study, and further reinforces the need to
study public welfare categorical expenditures separately. This variance is also
larger than that reported by Dawson and Grey (1971) for assistance payments.
As Table 2 illustrates it is not readily possible to account for this variance by
simple visual observation of the data. One might attempt to cluster the state by
region, for example but it quickly becomes obvious that this approach will not
suffice. Even if population size is controlled no readily apparent groupings come to
the fore. Therefore, in order to account for the variations in Old Age Assistance
expenditures it is necessary that we look further.
Table 2A. Variations in Aggregate State OAA Expenditures, Per Capita
Expenditures and Rank Order, 1970
States

Alabama

Total AAA
Expenditure
(in 000’s)

1970
Population
(in 000’s)

$19,840

Expenditure
Per Capita

3,444

-

Arizona

$2,091

1,771

$1.64

26

Arkansas

$8,614

1,923

$4.48

9

California

$211,276

19,953

$10.59

1

Colorado

$12,774

2,207

$5.79

4

$4,800

3,032

$1,58

28

$680

548

$1.24

34

Florida

$8,835

6,789

$1.30

33

Georgia

$11,268

4,590

$2.46

17

Hawaii

$1,254

769

$1.63

27

$846

713

$1.19

36

Illinois

$10,654

11,114

$0.96

42

Indiana

$3,008

5,194

$0.58

48

Delaware

Idaho

6

-

5

Alaska

Connecticut

-

$5.76

Rank

-

Table 2B. Variations in Aggregate State OAA Expenditures, Per Capita
Expenditures and Rank Order, 1970 (continued)
State

Iowa

Total AAA
1970
Expenditure Population
(in 000’s)
(in 000’s)

Expenditure
Per Capita

Rank

$14,843

2,824

$5.26

7

Kansas

$4,681

2,247

$2.08

22

Kentucky

$8,228

3,219

$2.56

15

Louisiana

$27,763

3,641

$7.62

2

Maine

$2,489

992

$2.51

16

Maryland

$1,332

3,922

$0.34

49

Massachusetts

$32,014

5,689

$5.62

6

Michigan

$17,200

8,875

$1.94

24

Minnesota

$8,066

3,805

$2.12

21

Mississippi

$7,658

2,217

$3.45

12

Missouri

$27,321

4,677

$5.84

3

Montana

$945

694

$1.36

32

$1,470

1,483

$1.99

41

$979

489

$2.00

23

New Hampshire

$3,159

738

$4.28

10

New Jersey

$7,791

7,168

$1.09

40

New Mexico

$1,188

1,616

$1.17

37

$59,374

18,191

$3.26

13

North Carolina

$6,160

5,082

$1.21

35

North Dakota

$1,182

618

$1.91

25

Ohio

$12,298

10,652

$1.15

39

Oklahoma

$12,198

2,559

$4.77

8

$2,448

2,091

$1.17

38

Pennsylvania

$26,989

11,794

$2.29

18

Rhode Island

$1,319

947

$1.39

31

South Carolina

$2,274

2,591

$0.88

44

South Dakota

$1,020

666

$1.53

30

Nebraska
Nevada

New York

Oregon
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Table 2C. Variations in Aggregate State OAA Expenditures, Per Capita
Expenditures and Rank Order, 1970

Tennessee

$7,214

3,924

1.84

26

$43,461

11,197

3.88

11

$717

1,059

.68

47

Vermont

$1,391

444

3.13

14

Virginia

$3,439

4,648

.73

46

Washington

$7,423

3,409

2.18

20

West Virginia

$2,760

1,744

1.58

29

$10,070

4,419

2.28

19

$313

332

.94

43

Texas
Utah

Wisconsin
Wyoming

Source: OAA Expenditures for Assistance to Recipient for Calendar year ending 12-31-70. (Table 4.
Source of Funds Expended for Public Assistance Payments: Calendar Year Ended 12-31-70,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, SRS, Program Statistics and Data System, NCSS,
August 11, 1971 (NCSS #FI(CV70)

An initial point for investigation might be the suggestion that public welfare
programs differ from other state activities (and expenditures) in a number of
essential points that are likely to have an impact on explaining expenditure levels,
First, throughout the entire history of federal assistance payments, fiscal
relationships have been heavily intergovernmental, with the federal government
providing anywhere from fifty to seventy five percent or more of the funds
expended. Thus, the probable federal impact on the program is not only a
contemporary one, similar to that of many other state programs today. It is also an
historical one enduring throughout the entire duration of the program. Thus, since
Sharkansky showed the existence of significant incremental effects in public welfare
as well as other areas of expenditure one might assume that the longer duration of
this federal relationship in public assistance is likely to have had its effects upon
the incremental nature of assistance expenditures.
Secondly, unlike the categories of aggregate state expenditures, most subclassifications of expenditures and overall public assistance spending, expenditures
for Old Age Assistance have not risen rapidly, and in fact when measured relative
to increases in the gross national product (GDP) public product expenditures or the
relative growth of the aged population, as shown in Table 3, such expenditures have
actually declined dramatically since 1950. One might suspect that this also would
have important implications for the explanation of variations in assistance
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expenditures. While most categories of spending have been growing with the
economy, Old Age Assistance has quite clearly been in decline for some time.
Finally, it may appear to some readers not familiar with the operation of public
assistance programs that an additional significant difference that sets them apart
from other areas of state spending is the quasi-market nature of the process of
expenditure determination. It is frequently assumed, for example, that an
assistance program involves two levels of decision bearing upon expenditures: First
there is the decision in the appropriations process allocating the state-matching
hare for the program. This decision virtually assures the corresponding federal
share, since federal assistance expenditures are open ended. Then, the fiscal
resource pool created by this decision is drawn upon by various welfare department
caseworkers – subject, of course, to the state controls and regulations – as funds are
needed by clients. The difficulties of this perspective are to be found in the phrase
“controls and regulations” for, in fact, the very nature of the assistance programs in
most states are such that these controls and regulations, and in particular the
process of determining statewide payment standards, do not impinge upon but
rather directly control this process of dispensing funds to clients. Payments are not
made under OAA or any other program on the basis of the amount actually needed
by clients. Rather, this is dependent on the amounts specified in these payment
standards and there is no assurance whatsoever that these standards will
correspond with the actual cost of living in a state, since there is no automatic
adjustment mechanism built in. Thus, it seems likely that administrative and
political considerations unique to the public assistance agencies in the various
states may, by themselves, play a substantial role in explaining expenditure
variations.

Testable Hypotheses
What then may be said to account for variations in Old Age Assistance payments
in a measurable way?
First, it is clear that any explanation of Old Age Assistance expenditure patterns
will be, like the other studies noted, multivariate in nature. It is implausible that
any single variable can sufficiently explain the interstate variance observed.
Secondly, given the strong federal role in the program, it seems likely that some
variation in the nature of federal-state relations may be related to the existing
variations in expenditure. Thirdly, because OAA expenditures have changed so
little during the past decade while the rest of the economy was expanding rapidly, it
seems rather pointless to attempt to link OAA expenditures to theoretical
statements about economic development. Whatever may be responsible for the
actual variation, it seems fairly certain that it is not differential economic growth.
Thus, we would do well to look elsewhere for an explanation. One place we might
look, for example, would be in the area of state political processes, although the
Dawson Robinson (1963) study showed convincingly that at least one such process,
inter-party competition, can be ruled out.
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Federal Role in OAA
One plausible hypothesis worthy of further exploration is that variations in OAA
expenditure levels are – perhaps more or less unintentionally – a direct result of
federal fiscal policy. Specifically, state expenditures may vary directly with the
financial lucrativeness for each state of the federal support – higher to states that
stand to gain more from the program and lower in those states which gain less. In
fact, this hypothesis of the impact of federal support was tested by Fisher in 1964,
but rejected as involving a probable spurious statistical relationship. The principal
issue in examining this possibility will therefore be to construct a non-spurious
measure. This problem can be solved, for example, through reference to the formula
cited in the assistance legislation to construct a theoretical maximization point at
which states gain the maximum federal return for their investment.
Thomas Dye (1966, 127) has already noted the relation between this distribution
formula and benefit payments:
Under the distribution formula, the federal government pays a lager
share of minimum benefits and a lesser share of additional benefits up
to a certain maximum benefit level after which it pays nothing . . . .
Since the formula means that the federal government pays a higher
proportion of lower benefits, the federal governed actually
(disproportionately) rewards the states for low payment per recipient.
My own research tends to validate this relationship within the context noted
above. That is, in the case of OAA expenditures, state appropriations represent the
intervening variable between federal contributions to the state and payments to
clients and acts to regulate both. Additionally, as noted, payment standards
determine payment size. Thus, to the extent that state action is affected by the
pattern of variable rewards and disincentives created by the federal formula, the
formula itself can be said to exercise an intervening influence on expenditures
through several channels.
The variable impact of the federal distribution formula on the states to which it
distributes funding can be measured by the following formula: states are
reimbursed one hundred percent of the first $38.00 of assistance expenditures per
recipient per month and 31/37th of the next $37.00. Beyond payments of $75/month,
state and local supports rise to one hundred percent. Thus, the state return of
federal funds is highest at the lowest levels, where the federal return is one
hundred percent. Payments between $38 and $75 are reimbursed at the diminished
rate and above that there is no federal return on state and local investments of
funds at all. The entire burden of spending is borne within the state. Therefore,
based on the assumption that states will be most willing to invest when there is at
least some additional federal return, the theoretical point of maximum state
investment can be computed by multiplying these figures by the number of
recipients receiving assistance in the state during the period under study.
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Other Hypotheses and Other Variables
An Alternative Urban Hypothesis
Another plausible hypothesis worthy of investigation is that the original
relationship established by Fabricant between urbanism as measured by the
percentage of urban population may still hold, if one properly takes into account
changes in the nature of the urban population since 1940. Particularly after 1945,
the growth of suburbs and the spread of urban sprawl dramatically changed the
actual meaning of urban in this country and elsewhere in the world. Thus, if we
substitute for the variable of percent of population in communities of 2,500 or more,
the measure of city populations – those in communities of 10,000 or more we may
have a better measure of urban ism. In addition, we may also wish to reconsider the
role of population density.

An Alternative Industrialization Hypothesis
Even though the general trend of the data have been discouraging, we might
also test for additional measures of industrial development in the states. One such
measure, which takes into account a dozen separate dimensions of industrial
development is the Sharkansky-Hofferbert industrialization factor score
(Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969). One might argue that industrial production is
only relevant for public assistance spending in so far as that production is taxed by
the states. In that case, some measure of the relative productivity of the state’s tax
system could be hypothesized as a possible predictor of assistance expenditures.
However, this relationship was considered and rejected by Fisher, using a measure
of the “Yield of the Representative Tax System (Fisher, 1964). Considering the
possibility that the problem might have been one of measurement error, a different
measure of this concept was developed for this study. The new measure consists of
the ratio of the aggregate personal income of a state to the total tax receipts and is
labeled “Wealth of the Public Sector.”

Poverty and State Spending
Fisher also found the seeming anomaly that the size of the poor population – as
measured by the percentages of families with incomes below $2,000 – was
significantly correlated with every other measure of state spending tested there was
no statistically significant relation to public welfare. Thus, this relationship was not
tested in this study. Any possible correlation between this variable and public
assistance spending would probably be most meaningful in the context of AFDC
anyway.

Administrative Influence
Another plausible hypothesis is that the relative impact of the agencies
administering the Old Age Assistance program may itself account for the variations
in state expenditures (Sharkansky, 1965). Thus, a very powerful Department of
Public Welfare in one state may be able to attain higher expenditures, while a less
11

powerful department in another state may only be able to negotiate a lower rate
with the governor and state legislators. One crude measure of such variations in
department administrative influence can be constructed using the percentage of all
state government employees working for a state’s Department of Public Welfare.

Political Culture
A number of other political measures may also be important because of the
continuing controversial nature of public welfare in the U.S., the climate of opinion
bearing on state decision makers is likely to be of some significance in impacting the
level of possible expenditures. Public opinion measures would not likely be very
effective in measuring this dimension since they tend to be both volatile and erratic
while OAA rates remain fairly consistent over the long haul. A more acceptable
measure of this dimension could be what Patterson has labeled the political cultures
of the states. Patterson applied Almond and Verba’s pioneering approach to
comparative political culture as the “system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols
and values which define the situation in which political action takes place.” (See
also Elazar, 1966, 79-116).

And Another Dimension of Political Parties
Finally, there is the possibility that rather rejecting the importance of political
parties entirely on the basis of the findings previously cited regarding interparty
competition, we might only reject that single dimension. On this basis then it could
be hypothesized that some other dimension of political party activity such as the
degree of partisanship or integration of their internal organizations is displayed by
the political parties of the various states as an impact on public welfare
expenditures. Indices of these two measures are also available in the literature of
comparative state political studies and can be employed here. These measures as
well as that for political culture are published in (Citizens Conference on State
Legislators, 1971).

Methodology
In all, a total of nine independent variables have been suggested as possibly
relevant to the explanation of variations in assistant payment levels for OAA in the
American states: the federal maximization point, percentage of urban population,
population density, industrial development, wealth of the public sector, percentage
of state employees working for DPW, state political culture, political party
integration and party partisanship.
Each of these independent variables was compared with the level of aggregate
expenditures for Old Age Assistance benefits per capita in 1970 using zero order,
partial and multiple correlation techniques. Per capita OAA expenditure was set as
the dependent variable to control for the effects of population size in the states. A
sample of 46 states was tested. Alaska was eliminated because of the small size of
the OAA population there. California and Louisiana were eliminated because of the
historical effects of the Townsend, McLain and Huey Long movements, all of which
12

had significant impact on spending for the aged in those states. The District of
Columbia was also not included.
Pearson product-moment coefficients of correlation were computed for the
relationship of each of the nine independent variables with the dependent variable,
as were coefficients of multiple correlation (R) and coefficients of multiple
determination (R2). These latter two items were computed in stepwise fashion, in
which the single most significant variable is entered into the equation first, then
the second most, and so forth. At each level or “step” in the analysis, the results
show an estimate of the total predictive significance of that combination of variables
as well as the numerical value and rank order of each variable’s contribution to the
total variance explained. In addition, partial correlation coefficients between the
expenditure level and each variable, controlling for the variables already in the
equation were computed. The partial correlation coefficients reported in Table 4
represent the partial for each variable at the step before it was introduced into the
equation. As such, this may be construed as a weak test for spurious correlation, in
that a partial correlation coefficient considerably smaller than the zero-order
coefficient, and approaching zero can be interpreted in this context as evidence that
the apparent significance of that correlation is actually attributable to the
intervening influence of variables already in the equation. Other partial correlation
coefficients were examined in a similar manner although the results are not
reported here. Table 4 reports the outcome of those procedures.
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Table 3. The Withering Away Thesis in Old Age Assistance
Year

1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970

OAA
Exp.
($000)

Total PA
Exp.
($000)

474,400 1,123,600
743,984 1,028,000
1,510,933 2,488,831
1,686,441 2,939,570
2,014,736 4,039,433
2,179,076 5,868,357
2,085,440 14,346,912

OAA as
Pct. Of PA

42.2
72.4
60.7
57.4
49.9
37.1
14.5

Total
Govt.
Purchases
(in
Billions)
14.0
82.3
37.9
74.2
99.6
137.0
220.5

OAA as
Pct. Of
Govt.
Purchases

GDP
(In $
Billions)

OAA as
Pct. Of
GDP

3.39
.90
3.98
2.27
2.02
1.59
.95

99.7
211.9
284.8
398.0
503.7
684.9
986.5

.48
.35
.61
.42
.40
.34
.21

Table 4. The Relationships between Aggregate Expenditures Old Age Assistance and Eight Possible
Predictors.

Order Variable Name
of
Entry
Federal Maximization Point
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Correlation
Coefficient

Partial
Correlation

.496*

---

Political Culture

.067

-.239*

Urban Population (Pct.)

-.053

State Employees in DPW

Multiple
Correlation
Coeff (R)
.446*

Coeff. Of Multiple
Determination (R2)

Addition to R2

.246

.250

.538*

.289

.043

-.203

.564*

.318

.029

.256*

.251*

.601*

.361

.043

Population Density

.105

.273*

.640*

.409

.047

Public Sector Wealth

.031

.141

.648

.421

.012

Industrialization

.054

.094

.653

.426

.005

Party Integration

.180

.049

.654

.427

.001

* Relationship is significant at the .05 level.
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Findings
Five of the nine independent variables were found to be correlated with
aggregate Old Age Assistance expenditures in the American states. Three other
variables were found not to be related and one of the original nine variables was
eliminated on the basis of multi-collinearity.
The five significant variables in rank order of their correlations are: the federal
maximization point for a state, the state political culture, the percentage of urban
population in communities above 10,000 population, the proportion of state
employees in the Department of Public Welfare and population density in a state.
These represent two demographic measures – population size and population
density- and three measures of political system characteristics: intergovernmental
relations, the political culture of a state, and administrative politics. The three
nonsignificant variables at the zero order level were the measures of the wealth of
the public sector of a state, the industrialization of the state and the level of
political party integration. The degree of partisanship was dropped from the
analysis because it approaches identity with political culture and is of less value as
a predictor.
In general, these findings are in keeping with previous studies in which different
but related measures were found to correlate highly with other forms of state
expenditure, but not with welfare expenditures. It remains to test the relationships
between the significant variables found here and other forms of state expenditures
and between the non-significant variables isolated here and other types of public
welfare expenditures to see if any of these relationships hold more generally.
Taken together, the five significant variables in this study account for roughly
40 percent of the previously unexplained variance in aggregate Old Age Assistance
expenditures when population size of the states is controlled for. Over half of this
variance is accounted for by the single variable of the federal maximization point, a
finding whose explanation requires further investigation not only the for the case of
public assistance programs (especially AFDC) but also in the case of other federal
grant-in-aid programs. The policy implications of this relationship may be quite
profound: at least a portion of the deficiencies which have historically been
attributed to the states with respect to the operation of public assistance programs
may, in large measure, be due instead to the effect of the patterns of incentives
created for the states by the federal distribution formulas.
It is worth noting here that this relationship is not, as it may at first appear, a
spurious one in which aggregate expenditures are the product of available federal
funds and a constant. For one thing, the measures selected here eliminate this
possibility as a mere statistical artifact. The aggregate expenditures variable is
controlled for population size and the federal formula variable is extended by the
size of the client population (which is not a constant function of total population)
since the proportion of aged persons in the population of each state varies widely.
Secondly, at a substantive policy level, each state has the option of how far beyond

the point of maximum federal return they wish to go and the evidence is clear (see
Table 2) that states have exercised this option in a highly diverse manner.
Beyond this, several other things might be said about this set of findings: For
example, it raises serious doubt about the appropriateness of the economic
development framework for explaining variations in welfare spending among the
states. While two measures of urbanization were found to be significant predictors
of these variations, the composite measure of industrialization was rejected from
the equation. (Rejection here was based on both a low contribution to the explained
variance and an F-score suggesting that this might be a purely chance relation.
This, combined with the previously noted non-significance of the Wealth of the
Public Sector variable, is generally supportive of this conclusion.
The measures of urbanism employed here are more closely associated with the
phenomenon of city life than the indicator used in previous studies and this fact
alone appears to have increased the predictive significance of these variables. This
suggests, among other things, a possible pathway for future study: substituting a
measure such as the proportion of population in urban setting of 50,000 or even
100,000 people. Also, bringing the excluded states – Alaska, California, Louisiana
and the District of Columbia – back into the mix would also be important in further
understanding the importance of urbanism here. We can conclude from this study
that some level of urbanism is quite clearly related to welfare expenditure levels for
the aged even though the statistical significance of these two measures together
accounts for only about seven percent of the total observed variation.
Equally important here is the rejection of two of the three political party-related
variables – the party integration and partisanship measures. A third political
system variable – political culture – was found to account for roughly an additional
four percent of variance. Given the widely held polarity of views for and against
public welfare, and the general premise that humanitarian values toward the poor
and social welfare programs are distinctly urban phenomena, it seems altogether
plausible that the level of urbanism and a favorable political culture in a state
might act together to suppress or enhance the level of welfare spending for the aged.
Finally, about four percent of the unexplained variance and ten percent of the
variance explained here can be attributed to the size of the state’s public welfare
agency in proportion to total state government. This was introduced as a weak
measure of agency politics as a factor in explaining OAA expenditure levels. Given
this finding and the importance of the state maximization point, further study
should seek to include stronger measures of the role of the public welfare
bureaucracy in influencing the state contributions above the federal maximization
point.
In the context of past research on this topic in which predictors of state and local
spending have been divided into political, economic and demographic measures,
what is particularly surprising about the findings here is the general prominence of
the demographic factors. Even among the political variables, those most closely
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associated with distributive decision-making (partisanship and party integration,
and the previously rejected inter-party competition) were found to be not
significant, while the most social structural of these, political culture, is found to be
most important. Perhaps most surprising of all, however, is the general
insignificance of measures of political economy as predictors of welfare expenditures
in the case of the aged.

Conclusions
What this all appears to suggest is the general conclusion that economic
conditions and considerations in a state – historically the very things that led to the
initial adoption of the OAA program during the Great Depression – are relatively
unimportant in explaining variations in one of the four public assistance programs,
Old Age Assistance. While the general tendency in the literature previously
discussed was for public assistance spending to resist explanation, roughly forty
percent of the explained variance can be accounted for by the five variables
identified in this study. Particularly important in this regard is the significance of
two variables – federal influence, as measured by the maximization point and the
impact of the state’s political culture. These two measures together account for
nearly one third of the observed variance.
Equally as significant as these findings are the non-relationships established in
these data. While variables measuring facets of the economic development and tax
aspects of the state environment appear relevant to stat spending in a variety of
other domains, they appear to account for virtually none of the variance observed in
OAA expenditures. As noted above, this is probably due to the intervening influence
of the federal-state fiscal relationship built into the legislation creating public
assistance, which can be seen to diminish the reliance of a state on its in-state
environment for revenue generation.
Also significant are the non-relations established between assistance
expenditures and the measure of political party activity – party integration. While
at the level of zero-order correlations this appears at least slightly significant when
the other variables are controlled, its influence is virtually eliminated. Meanwhile,
all of the other seven variables are strengthened by the same procedure. Further,
this variable was selected last by the step-wise regression procedure and with the
other seven variables in the equation, it accounts for less than one percent of
explained variance. All of this suggests that state-level political party integration is
not a factor of any importance in explaining state spending on Old Age Assistance.
We should not conclude from this that state-level political factors in general are
unimportant in explaining variations in state spending for OAA since two other
political variables – state political culture and welfare agency political impact –
together account for nearly one third of the total explained variance. Further, it is
entirely plausible that the social/demographic variables found significant in this
study are, in fact, measuring dimensions of other state-level political phenomena.
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These findings also suggest some possible future directions for research. First, it
would seem necessary to utilize this same individualized programmatic approach to
examine AFDC, Aid to the Blind and Aid to the Disabled programs if one is to
account for increased portions of the variance in those program s as well. Of the
variables tested here it seems plausible that some of them – the federal formula,
DPW administrative politics and political culture – may also prove to be of
importance in those programs as well. In addition, because of the controversial
nature of the AFDC program in particular, additional state political variables
including the two political party measures that proved to be of little importance in
the case of OAA, would be worth further examination. One of the roles that a state
political party system might play with respect to public welfare assistance might be
to modulate these kinds of political controversies and conflicts. It is noteworthy that
to the present old people have long been regarded as “the worthy poor” and Old Age
Assistance has never been the kind of political football that AFDC has become.
Even with these results we still can account for only slightly less than half of the
total observed variance in Old Age Assistance expenditures. It seems entirely likely
that a major portion of the unexplained variance will remain unexplained without
extensive and detailed examination of the administrative and political context of
the program. Since the program itself has now been replaced by the uniform
national Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, this research will be a task
for quantitatively oriented historians.
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